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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a competitive defender-attacker risk model that
assumes a dual exponential relationship between defender (Ci) and attacker (Ai) resource allocation:
viðAi;CiÞ ¼ e2ai ci 2 e2aiCi2giAi :
Design/methodology/approach – Network risk is defined in terms of degree sequence, g, node/link
damage, d, and probability of failure, v:R ¼Pgividi: The paper finds the optimal allocation of
resources (Ai, Ci) that minimizes R from the defender’s point of view, and maximizes R from the
attacker’s point of view.
Findings – The effectiveness of the optimal min-max strategy is compared with three allocation
strategies: random, non-network, and network. It is shown that total network risk is minimized by the
non-network strategy, because this strategy considers damage values and ignores network topology in
the definition of risk.
Originality/value – The method is illustrated by applying it to critical infrastructure – a
hypothetical water-and-power network.
Keywords Risk analysis, Risk management, Resource allocation
Paper type Research paper
Nomenclature
G ¼ a network composed of n nodes,
m links
gi ¼ degree of node if asset i is a node,
and 1 if asset i is a link
n ¼ total number of nodes
m ¼ total number of links
R(Ai, Ci) ¼ total risk of a network
Rinit ¼ total initial risk of a network
Rnorm ¼ total normalized risk of
a network
ri ¼ risk of asset i
T ¼ threat, the probability of an attack
vi(Ai, Ci) ¼ probability of node/link failure
given an attack as a function of
attacker and defender allocation
costs
vi(Ai) ¼ attacker vulnerability to asset i
vi(Ci) ¼ defender vulnerability to asset i
Ci(Ai) ¼ optimal defender cost of
hardening asset i
Ai(Ci) ¼ optimal attacker cost of attacking
asset i
di ¼ expected damage (consequence)
to node/link i if successfully
attacked
ai ¼ defender calibration factor
determined by ECi and EFi
gi ¼ attacker calibration factor
determined by ACi and AFi
ECi ¼ defender elimination cost to
reduce vulnerability and achieve
fraction EFi
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EFi ¼ defender elimination fraction for
node/link i, i.e. the percentage of
availability obtained for an
investment of ECi
ACi ¼ attacker investment cost to
increase vulnerability and
achieve fraction AFi
AFi ¼ attacker fraction for node/link
i for an investment of ACi to
attack asset i
B ¼ defender total budget in dollars
B0 ¼ attacker total budget in dollars
l1, l2 ¼ Lagrange multipliers
Introduction
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) defines risk as the product of vulnerability, v, and
consequence, d: r ¼ vd, where v is the probability that a component or asset will fail if
attacked or stressed, and d is the (financial or fatality) consequence if a failure occurs.
Vulnerability, v, is an a priori estimate of the probability of failure, and consequence, d,
is typically measured in dollars or lives. In some cases, it is appropriate to include the
threat, T, which is the probability of an attack or stress being applied to the component
or asset. In this case, r ¼ Tvd (Lewis, 2006).
The simple PRA approach does not model an interdependent system of components
and assets; what we define as a network. Lewis and Al-Mannai used network theory to
model critical infrastructure such as water, power, energy, transportation, and
telecommunication systems as networks. Their model represents a system of assets as
an abstract graph, G ¼ {N ;E; f }, where N is a set of n assets called nodes; E is a set of
m relationships or connections called links, and f:N £ E is a mapping of links to node
pairs. G defines a network or system of i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nþm assets – each with its own
vulnerability vi and consequence di.
In terms of PRA, the individual risk associated with asset i (node or link) is simply
ri ¼ vidi; and so the total risk contribution over n þ m assets is simply R ¼
P
ri:
Unfortunately, this simple definition of risk ignores the synergistic effects of a
network. For example, it ignores the fact that a network node with many connections is
more important to the overall functionality of the system than a node with only one
connection.
Albert et al. (2000) studied the vulnerability of structured networks (versus random
networks) in terms of their ability to remain connected. They found that degree
sequence g ¼ {g1; g2; . . . ; gn} of network structure makes a major difference in the
survivability of a network. If the network is random, its degree sequence distribution
will obey a binomial distribution. In a scale-free network, the distribution follows a
power law. Scale-free networks can be protected by focusing on their high-degreed hub
nodes at the expense of less connected nodes. Albert and Barabasi assumed all nodes
and links are of equal value, however, which rarely occurs in the real world. Lewis
(2006) introduced weights, representing consequences, on nodes and links, and
extended the Albert-Barabasi model.
Lewis (2006) generalized the Albert-Barabasi result by introducing consequences;
each node and link is assigned a damage value in addition to degree. But, Lewis
assumed a linear relationship between allocation and reduction of vulnerability, which
is unrealistic. In addition, Lewis did not provide a closed-form solution to the minimum
risk allocation problem we solve in this paper.
Al Mannai and Lewis (2007) give closed-form solutions to the problem of allocating










where gi – degree of node if asset i is a node, and 1 if asset i is a link; vi – probability of
failure, if attacked; di – damage/consequence if asset i fails.
They compared linear and non-linear models of vulnerability versus allocation and
showed that overall network risk is minimized by allocating more resources to nodes
and links with higher values of the product: gidi=ECi: The Al Mannai-Lewis model
considers risk from the defender’s point of view, and ignores the attacker.
Major (2002) proposed an attacker-defender model using a zero-sum game-theoretic
approach. Major showed how to find an optimal allocation of resources for both
attacker and defender, but considered only a single asset or target. Major defined
expected loss or risk (EL) as a function of both attacker and defender resources, and the











Vulnerability, pðVi;Ai;DiÞ is the probability of total destruction of target i; Vi, the
target value; Ai, the resource assigned to target i by the attacker, and Di, the defender
allocation to defend the asset. Instead of this model, we study two other models –
linear and exponential – that represent defender and attacker vulnerability.
Powers and Shen (2006) extended Major’s (2002) probability model for a single asset
by allowing simultaneous attacks on multiple assets. Powers and Shen introduced a
sophisticated attacker-defender model in which the defender wants to minimize its
expected loss and the attacker want to maximize its expected gain. We employ a
similar technique to find optimal resource allocation to a network of connected assets,
nodes and links.
Powell (2006) presented a basic game-theoretic framework for allocating defensive
resources against long-term threats. Resources are allocated to harden sites,
reduce vulnerabilities, and make the sites less attractive and difficult to attack.
Optimally, the defender will allocate resources to minimize the attacker’s payoff, and
conversely, the attacker will allocate resources to maximize the defender’s payoff. We
employ the same min-max strategy in the following model, which extends the
defender-attacker model to a network of assets rather than a single asset.
These models provide the basis for a defender-attacker model that, when combined
with network analysis, comprehensively model system-wide risk. We propose a new
risk model that incorporates both defender and attacker as proposed by Major (2002),
Powell (2006), and Powers and Shen (2006), but in addition, combines network effects
as proposed by Al Mannai and Lewis (2007). The objective of our model is to “buy
down” risk by reducing vulnerability partially or fully, depending on the vulnerability
reduction equation. This requires a new definition of risk, and an equation that relates
vulnerability to investment.
In this paper, vulnerability decreases exponentially as the defender increases
allocation. Zero allocation leaves an asset 100 percent vulnerable, but it takes an
infinite allocation to derive vulnerability to zero. Similarly, vulnerability increases with
increase in allocation by the attacker. But, if an attacker allocates zero resources, the




Then we combine defender and attacker vulnerability functions into one function
for each asset, viðAi;CiÞ, and then use the Al Mannai-Lewis definition of network risk.
All components of the network, nodes and links, have an associated risk, which is





where, gi – 1, if asset i is a link, degree of node, if asset i is a node; vi(Ai, Ci) –
vulnerability of asset i; Ai – allocation of attacker resources to attack asset i; Ci –
allocation of defender resources to defend asset i; di – consequences (damages) to asset
i if successfully attacked.
Given resource constraints on allocations (Ai, Ci), and the game-theoretic motivation
of the defender to minimize risk and the attacker to maximize risk, we can solve for
ðAi;CiÞ in terms of network topology and asset consequences. Closed-form solutions
for defender are found in terms of attacker allocation, and attacker allocation is found
in terms of defender allocation. Thus, an “arms race” ensues, because the defender
allocates resources to assets based on perceived attacker allocation, and vice versa. We
provide an iterative “arms race” algorithm for finding the min-max solution to this
conundrum.
We ask the question: “Is the min-max network resource allocation strategy best?”
Three strategies for minimizing network risk are compared:
(1) Random strategy, in which the defender and attacker budgets are allocated
equally to all components of the network.
(2) Non-network strategy, in which the defender and attacker budgets are
optimally allocated to components ignoring degree sequence.
(3) Network strategy, in which the defender and attacker budgets are optimally
distributed to components based on both damage values and network topology.
Defender-attacker vulnerability
Al Mannai and Lewis (2007) defined defender availability of asset (node or link) i for
the linear cost model in terms of resource allocation, Ci, and cost, ECi, to reduce
vulnerability to fraction, EFi. Instead, we will change the notation and use
vulnerability, which is the complement of availability:
viðCiÞ ¼ 12 Ci
ECi
 
0 # viðCiÞ # 1; 0 # Ci # ECi: ð1Þ
Defender vulnerability, vi(Ci), decreases linearly to zero when defender allocation, Ci, is
equal to the cost of eliminating vulnerability, ECi.
On the other hand, attacker vulnerability, vi(Ai), increases linearly to 100 percent
when attacker allocation, Ai, is equal to the cost of increasing vulnerability, ACi.
Attacker vulnerability is expressed as:
viðAiÞ ¼ Ai
ACi
0 # viðAiÞ # 1; 0 # Ai # ACi: ð2Þ
Al Mannai and Lewis (2007) defined the exponential defender availability of an asset





availability to fraction, EFi. By contrast, we change the notation and use vulnerability,
instead:




0 , ðEFiÞ # 1: ð4Þ
An asset’s vulnerability is an exponentially decreasing function of the amount of
funding used to harden a component: greater spending yields lower vulnerability. Note
that vulnerability is 100 percent when there is no allocation, Ci ¼ 0. On the other hand,
it takes an infinite allocation to entirely eliminate vulnerability. Parameter ai is chosen
so that vulnerability decreases to EFi when Ci ¼ ECi. Therefore, ai is determined by
elimination cost ECi, and the elimination fraction, EFi. Parameters ECi and EFi are used
to calibrate these functions, as shown in Figure 1.
The same argument is made for the attacker, except vulnerability increases with the
amount of funding applied by the attacker:
viðAiÞ ¼ 12 e2giAi 0 # viðAiÞ , 1; ð5Þ
where:
gi ¼ 2lnð12 AFiÞ
ACi
0 # ðAFiÞ , 1: ð6Þ
The fault tree of Figure 2 is used to derive the combined attacker-defender
vulnerability. A successful attack occurs when the attacker succeeds with probability
viðAiÞ ¼ 12 e2giAi or the defender fails to avoid an attack with probability viðCiÞ ¼
e2aiCi : Thus, the joint probability of a successful attack is:
viðAi;CiÞ ¼ viðCiÞviðAiÞ ¼ e2aiCi
 
12 e2giAi
  ¼ e2aiCi 2 e2aiCi2giAi : ð7Þ
Figure 1.
Vulnerability functions of

















The joint vulnerability equation should withstand a reasonableness test when there is
no attack, Ai ¼ 0, and when there is no defense, Ci ¼ 0. Table I tabulates the results of
applying equation (5) to the four vulnerability function outcome events. If there is no
defense, and no attack (Ai ¼ 0), vulnerability should be 0 percent, and it is. If there is an
attack, and the defender has expended no resource Ci ¼ 0, vulnerability should be vi(Ai),
which it is. Finally, the probability of a successful attack when both defender and
attacker have allocated non-zero resources is the product of vulnerabilities as shown in
Table I. Therefore, the defender-attacker vulnerability function makes real-world sense.
Network risk
Lewis (2006) defines network risk, R, as the degree-weighted sum over all node and link
risks in network G. Let gi ¼ 1 when component i is a link, and gi ¼ degree of node i
when the network component is a node. Al Mannai and Lewis (2007) show that
































Events Attacker allocation Defender allocation Vulnerability, Vi
I Ai ¼ 0 (no attack) Ci ¼ 0 (not protected) 0
II Ai ¼ 0 (no attack) Ci (protected) 0
III Ai (attack) Ci ¼ 0 (not protected) vi(Ai)














Network risk is identical to PRA risk when gi ¼ 1, which corresponds with a
non-network definition. All assets, nodes and links, are treated as independent,
unrelated targets. On the other hand, when gi $ 1, highly connected nodes are
considered more critical than less-connected nodes. In this case, network risk resembles
(but is not defined the same as) the definition used by Albert and Barabasi. The
definition used here extends the definition of risk to networks in keeping with the
literature on network analysis.
Allocation strategies
Equations (9)-(11) define network risk in terms of network topology, defender attacker
vulnerability, and consequence. Equation (9) shows that risk is reduced by increasing
Ci, because increasing defender resources reduces vulnerability. On the contrary, risk
is increased by increasing attacker allocation, Ai. Thus, R poses a two-party
nonzero-sum game between competitors.
Given a defender budgetB and attacker budgetB0, what is the best way for a defender
to allocateB across i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nþm assets such thatR is minimized? Similarly, what


















Ai ¼ B0 Ci;Ai $ 0: ð14Þ
Clearly, we can find optimal allocations from both defender and attacker points of view.
But an opponent may or may not execute an attack based on optimization. Rather, an
attacker might adopt a less than perfect strategy such as random targeting, or a
semi-optimized non-network strategy. We should analyze each possible scenario that
may occur when players elect non-optimal strategy as well as the optimized network
strategy. Therefore, we explore three strategies and compare them with one another.
Random strategy
In this strategy, the defender and attacker distribute their resources equally among all










Substituting the values of defender allocation, Ci, and attacker allocation, Ai, for each
component in the network into equations (9) and (10) give total and normalized




















This strategy ignores network topology and sets gi ¼ 1 in equation (8). In this case, the
defender’s objective is to minimize total risk while the attacker wants to maximize total
risk.













Ai ¼ B0 gi ¼ 1 for all i Ci;Ai $ 0: ð21Þ

















Minimizing the total risk by the defender, we differentiate with respect to Ci and solve









CiðAiÞ ¼ lnai þ ln di þ lnð12 e
2giAi Þ2 ln l1
ai
: ð24Þ
Note that the defender allocation, Ci, should be greater than or equal to zero. Negative
Ci, means that the component is not worth protecting, so it is set to zero. Also, we have
to be careful when applying this equation to consider the possibility that logarithmic
terms are defined.
















Now, for the attacker, we differentiate with respect to Ai and solve for the optimal cost





AiðCiÞ ¼ lngi þ ln di 2 aiCi 2 ln l2
gi
: ð28Þ
















Substitution of equations (24) and (28) into equations (9) and (10) give the total network
risk and the normalized network risk for the non-network strategy. But, the solution for
Ci requires Ai, and the solution for Ai requires Ci. This suggests an arms race, whereby
the defender sets up an initial defense, and the attacker responds with an initial attack
allocation. The defender escalates its defense, and so does the attacker. Eventually, the





The process to find the optimal fixed point in the arms race game of attacker and
defender allocations is as follows. Initially, assume an attacker budget that is distributed
equally over all components in the network. Compute the value of the Lagrange
constant, l1 from equation (26) andCi from equation (24). Next, useCi and l1 as inputs to
equations (30) and (28) to compute the optimal defender, Ci, and attacker allocations of
each component, Ai. Repeat this process until there is no change in Ci and Ai.
We must test allocation results for each component to make sure it is a positive
value. If it is negative, then we set it to zero because it is not worth protecting. The
iterative process is started again to compute a new value of l1 until Ci becomes
positive. Also, we use both Ci’s and Ai’s as inputs into equation (26) to compute the
second Lagrange constant, l2. After that, we compute the optimal attacker allocations,
Ai ’s from equation (30). Once again if Ai is a negative value then we set it to zero
because it is not worth attacking such a component, and start the process again.
The arms race halts when the difference between the previous Ai and the new one is
less than a threshold value. The pseudo code for this process is as follows:
//The process of computing the optimal values of the defender and attacker allocations
FOR each node and edge
Initially set Attacker Allocation ¼ Total Attacker Budget/(Nodes þ Edges)
END FOR
//Computer defender allocations Ci’s
START THE PROCESS
WHILE (no negative defender allocations Ci’s)
Compute Lagrange Multiplier l1
FOR each node and edge
Compute optimal defender allocations Ci’s
IF defender allocation is less than zero




Compute Lagrange Multiplier l2
//Compute attacker allocations Ai’s
WHILE (no negative attacker Allocations Ai’s)
FOR each node and edge
Compute optimal attacker allocations Ai’s
IF attacker allocation is less than zero




//Compute Total and Normalized Risk











Set Normalized Risk normR to old value
START THE PROCESS
Set Normalized Risk normR to new value
Compute Root Mean Square of the new and old normR values
IF Root mean square is less than or equal to threshold value
Stop Convergence
ELSE
Start the process again until it converges to the threshold value
ENDIF
Interestingly, defender and attacker allocations identify the highest consequence
components as the most critical. Therefore, the optimal defender-attacker allocation
establishes a rank order from highest consequence asset to lowest consequence asset, and
then allocates both defender and attacker resources to the highest-ranking assets, first.
Network strategy
In this strategy, gi ¼ degree of nodes or one for links, recall equation (9). The objective
function is still the same, equation (12), but this time we use the degree of nodes: gi $ 1.
Repeating differentiation of the Lagrangian objective function using the same
constraints yields new expressions for Ci and Ai. The optimal defender allocation Ci, in
terms of Ai, yields:
CiðAiÞ ¼ lnai þ ln gi þ ln di þ lnð12 e
2giAi Þ2 ln l1
ai
: ð31Þ
Note that defender allocation, Ci, should also be greater or equal zero. For negative Ci,
we set it to zero. In addition, we must be careful to avoid ln(0) singularities.












Differentiating with respect to Ai and solving for the optimal cost of attacker allocation
to attack components in the network:
AiðCiÞ ¼ ln gi þ ln gi þ ln di 2 aiCi 2 ln l2
gi
: ð33Þ















Substitution of equations (31) and (33) into equations (9) and (10) give the total network
risk and the normalized network risk for the network strategy.
Again the same process and pseudo code for computing the optimal defender and
attacker allocations in the non-network strategy are applied here in this strategy.
Network allocation sorts assets into descending order by gidi=ECi , and allocates in
rank order according to the product of degree times consequence divided by
vulnerability elimination cost.
Example: defender-attacker model strategies
As an illustrative example, suppose we compare the three strategies when applied to a
network model of a water-and-power system consisting of 59 components: 28 nodes
and 31 links, as shown Figure 3. Assume a defender’s input values of B, ECi, and EFi,
and an attacker’s input values of B0, ACi, and AFi. The input values are summarized in
Table II.
We use the network analysis software provided by Lewis (2006) and modified by Al
Mannai to implement the three strategies described here. The results are shown in
Figures 4-8, and Tables II-IV. We use the input values of Table II to obtain optimal risk
reduction. Figure 1 shows partial results of the calculation. The graphical display is
annotated with the number and name of each node or link, as well as the degree of each
node. The bar chart shown in the lower left-hand corner is the degree sequence
distribution of nodes, and gives an indication of the network’s structure. Each node and
Figure 3.
Network analysis softwareNotes: The graphical annotations are defined as: 0: N-0  node number: name of the node, No. 5:5  link





Component di gi ECi ACi g*d=EC
N6 200 4 60 60 13.33
N18 300 4 100 100 12.00
N8 200 3 60 60 10.00
N13 200 3 60 60 10.00
N14 100 3 30 30 10.00
N2 300 3 100 100 9.00
N19 300 3 100 100 9.00
N26 600 3 200 200 9.00
N10 400 3 150 150 8.00
N12 400 3 150 150 8.00
N5 200 2 60 60 6.67
N7 200 2 60 60 6.67
N22 200 2 60 60 6.67
N23 200 2 60 60 6.67
N24 100 2 30 30 6.67
N25 100 2 30 30 6.67
N0 600 2 200 200 6.00
N16 300 2 100 100 6.00
N20 300 2 100 100 6.00
N3 350 2 120 120 5.83
N1 400 2 150 150 5.33
N17 400 2 150 150 5.33
N4 100 1 30 30 3.33
N15 100 1 30 30 3.33
N21 200 1 60 60 3.33
L0 100 1 30 30 3.33
L1 100 1 30 30 3.33
L2 100 1 30 30 3.33
L3 100 1 30 30 3.33
L4 100 1 30 30 3.33
L5 100 1 30 30 3.33
L6 100 1 30 30 3.33
L7 100 1 30 30 3.33
L8 100 1 30 30 3.33
L9 100 1 30 30 3.33
L10 100 1 30 30 3.33
L11 100 1 30 30 3.33
L12 100 1 30 30 3.33
L13 100 1 30 30 3.33
L14 100 1 30 30 3.33
L15 100 1 30 30 3.33
L16 100 1 30 30 3.33
L17 100 1 30 30 3.33
L18 100 1 30 30 3.33
L19 100 1 30 30 3.33
L20 100 1 30 30 3.33
L21 100 1 30 30 3.33
L22 100 1 30 30 3.33
L23 100 1 30 30 3.33









link has an associated elimination cost, ECi, and damage value, di, but these values are
not shown in Figure 3.
We compared the reduction in normalized risk versus allocation of random,
non-network, and network strategies. In this case each node and link is assigned a
different consequence value, di, defender elimination cost to reduce vulnerability, ECi,
and attacker investment cost to increase vulnerability, ACi.
Figure 4 shows the normalized risk versus equal defender and attacker budgets
variation. The random strategy distributes defensive and offensive resources equally
Component di gi ECi ACi g*d=EC
L25 100 1 30 30 3.33
L26 100 1 30 30 3.33
L27 100 1 30 30 3.33
L28 100 1 30 30 3.33
L29 100 1 30 30 3.33
L30 100 1 30 30 3.33
N27 600 1 200 200 3.00
N9 400 1 150 150 2.67









normalized riskRandom Non-Network Network





among components in the network, which results in achieving minimum risk at low
budgets of the defender and attacker, and high risk as the resources increase.
The non-network strategy distributes defender and attacker resources optimally to
all components in the network, but ignoring degree sequence by setting gi ¼ 1. The
results show that normalized risk is initially higher for modest budget, but then
becomes lower than the random allocation strategy.
Figure 6.
Components normalized
risk in rank order Random Non-Network Network
Figure 7.
Defender allocation ratio
versus components Random Non-Network Network
Figure 8.
Attacker allocation ratio





B B0 R normrisk R normRisk R normRisk
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
500 500 1,891.41 0.1681253 2,752.62 0.24467733 2,353.55 0.20920444
1,000 1,000 2,197.22 0.1953084 2,997.32 0.26642844 4,336.2 0.38544
1,500 1,500 2,133.46 0.1896409 2,668.87 0.23723289 3,180.65 0.28272444
2,000 2,000 1,996.2 0.17744 2,288.83 0.20345156 2,558.39 0.22741244
2,500 2,500 1,850.84 0.1645191 1,854.18 0.164816 2,072.54 0.18422578
3,000 3,000 1,709.33 0.1519404 1,452.46 0.12910756 1,623.52 0.14431289
3,500 3,500 1,573.18 0.1398382 1,113.83 0.09900711 1,245.01 0.11066756
4,000 4,000 1,442.76 0.1282453 842.19 0.07486133 941.37 0.08367733
4,500 4,500 1,318.6 0.1172089 630.69 0.05606133 704.97 0.062664
5,000 5,000 1,201.32 0.106784 469.15 0.04170222 524.4 0.04661333
5,500 5,500 1,091.46 0.0970187 347.34 0.03087467 388.24 0.03451022
6,000 6,000 989.3 0.0879378 256.28 0.02278044 286.47 0.025464
6,500 6,500 894.92 0.0795484 188.64 0.016768 210.86 0.01874311
7,000 7,000 808.2 0.07184 138.61 0.01232089 154.93 0.01377156
7,500 7,500 728.9 0.0647911 101.72 0.00904178 113.7 0.01010667
8,000 8,000 656.64 0.058368 74.58 0.00662933 83.36 0.00740978
8,500 8,500 591 0.0525333 54.64 0.00485689 61.07 0.00542844
9,000 9,000 531.54 0.047248 40.01 0.00355644 44.72 0.00397511
9,500 9,500 477.77 0.0424684 29.29 0.00260356 32.74 0.00291022
10,000 10,000 429.24 0.0381547 21.44 0.00190578 23.96 0.00212978
Note: Initial risk ¼ 11,250
Table III.




B B/B0 R NormRisk R normRisk R normRisk
0 0 4,835.63 0.4298338 5,255.98 0.46719822 4,559.37 0.40527733
500 0.5 3,173.23 0.2820649 4,022.99 0.35759911 4,385.53 0.38982489
1,000 1 2,197.22 0.1953084 2,997.32 0.26642844 4,336.19 0.38543911
1,500 1.5 1,600.46 0.1422631 1,186.81 0.10549422 2,684.67 0.23863733
2,000 2 1,218.07 0.1082729 762.21 0.067752 941.5 0.08368889
2,500 2.5 960.44 0.0853724 489.51 0.043512 539.77 0.04797956
3,000 3 778.13 0.0691671 314.38 0.02794489 346.65 0.03081333
3,500 3.5 643.27 0.0571796 201.9 0.01794667 222.63 0.01978933
4,000 4 539.71 0.0479742 129.67 0.01152622 142.98 0.01270933
4,500 4.5 457.79 0.0406924 83.27 0.00740178 91.82 0.00816178
5,000 5 391.48 0.0347982 53.48 0.00475378 58.97 0.00524178
5,500 5.5 336.87 0.029944 34.34 0.00305244 37.87 0.00336622
6,000 6 291.3 0.0258933 22.06 0.00196089 24.32 0.00216178
6,500 6.5 252.89 0.0224791 14.16 0.00125867 15.62 0.00138844
7,000 7 220.26 0.0195787 9.09 0.000808 10.03 0.00089156
7,500 7.5 192.37 0.0170996 5.84 0.00051911 6.44 0.00057244
8,000 8 168.41 0.0149698 3.75 0.00033333 4.13 0.00036711
8,500 8.5 147.75 0.0131333 2.41 0.00021422 2.65 0.00023556
9,000 9 129.86 0.0115431 1.54 0.00013689 1.7 0.00015111
9,500 9.5 114.32 0.0101618 0.99 0.000088 1.09 9.6889 £ 1025
10,000 10 100.79 0.0089591 0.63 0.000056 0.7 6.2222 £ 1025









The network strategy distributes defender and attacker budgets optimally considering
nodes degree sequences, which results in high-normalized risk for low budget but then
rapidly falls off for higher budget, ending up approximately the same as the
non-network allocation.
Figure 4 shows that network allocation strategies perform poorly under
highly-restricted resource limitations. When resources are plentiful, there is little
difference. But, for very small budgets, the random allocation strategy performs better
than the non-random strategies! For this particular example, the non-random strategies
begin to pay off only when B and B0 exceed 3,000. Moreover, for high budgets, there is
little difference between network and non-network strategies.
Figure 5 shows the normalized risk versus the ratio of defender and attacker
budgets, where the attacker’s budget, B0 ¼ 2,000, and the defender’s budget is varied.
Increasing the defensive resources, B, reduces network risk. The non-network strategy
seems to be best because it achieves minimum risk when applied to the example, but
keep in mind that network risk will always be higher than non-network risk because of
the way we have defined network risk as a degree sequence weighted sum.
The decision on whether to use network or non-network risk as a measure of risk
depends on the analysts’ motivation. If protection of the network’s assets is the
primary motivation, then non-network risk should be preferred. If protection of the
network topology as well as its assets is the motivation, then the network risk, which
incorporates degree sequence, should be preferred.
We analyze the risk of each component in the network when applying the three
strategies. Again, if the decision is to protect the most critical assets in the network
then the network strategy is the best. Figure 6 shows this because it achieves minimum
risk for 20 components that are considered the most critical according to g*d=EC. On
the other hand, the random strategy yields maximum risk for these components and
the non-network falls in between the random and network strategies.
This result also shows that the random strategy achieves minimum risk for about 39
less-critical assets because this strategy focuses on protecting the non-critical components.
This explains why the random strategy achieves minimum total risk of the network: the
number of non-critical assets are two-thirds of the total assets in the network.
The network strategy achieves maximum risks for less-critical assets because it
focuses mostly on protecting the most critical assets in a network. Since, the number of
critical assets in this example is one-third of the total assets, the total network risk of
this strategy is the highest.
In addition, the results of the non-network strategy show that component risks fall
between the network and random strategies. The component risks obtained are almost
the same because this strategy ignores network topology and considers all 59 assets as
having degree equal to one.
Now let us look closely at how the defender and attacker budgets are distributed
among assets in the network. Figure 7 shows the defensive allocation ratio for a
budget, B ¼ 2,000, versus component’s rank ordering. The random strategy
distributes defender resources mostly to noncritical assets and does not follow the
rank order, g*d=EC. The normalized network risk is 0.1774, and the initial risk of the
network is 11,250. Since the number of non-critical assets is two-thirds of the number of





The non-network strategy does not follow the rank order distribution, because the
degree sequence is set equal to one. The normalized network risk is 0.2034, and the
initial network risk is 11,250. The network strategy distributes defensive resources
optimally to protect the most critical first followed by the less-critical assets, according
to, g*d=EC. The normalized network risk is 0.2274 which is the highest compared to
the other strategies because the number of critical assets used in the illustrated
example are less than the non-critical.
Figure 8 shows how the attacker budget is distributed among components in the
network. Applying the random strategy, results show more investment in attacking
the less-critical assets and not following the rank order distribution. The results from
applying the non-network and network strategies show that the attacker invests
resources equally over all components in the network. This allocation pattern comes
from the derivation of equations (28) and (33).
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